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Abstract 
This research hinges upon the relationship between fiscal decentralization (FD) and 
subjective well-being (SWB) in Chile. We merge data from two household surveys 
(2011 and 2013) in which a life satisfaction question was included, with municipal-
level information. By using a FD proxy that measures the share of municipal 
unconditional grants on all revenues, we produce an instrumental variable to test in 
the context of an ordered logistic multilevel model. Our contribution is twofold. 
First, we find evidence that, on average, FD does affect SWB positively. Second, 
we find this effect to depend on the satisfaction group in which individuals belong. 
Evidence from this study indicates that the effect in question is non-linear and that 
only high SWB groups are clearly benefitted. Since this reflects different priorities 
across SWB groups, this paper’s evidence is a call for a more aggressive inter-
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It has been argued that decentralization in general—and fiscal decentralization (FD) in 
particular—may enhance the quality of local public goods (Oates 1972). The theoretical 
literature has provided numerous well-known hypotheses that support this. Among others, it has 
been argued that decentralization takes advantage of a more accurate knowledge of local 
authorities about their own constituency (Hayek 1945); that it encourages stronger accountability 
to people (Seabrihgt 1996, Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2014); and that it raises the likelihood of 
more innovation in the design of effective public policies (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Kotsogiannis 
and Schwager 2006), among other factors. Nonetheless, the down side of decentralization has 
been widely documented (e.g., Treisman 2007, Boffa et al. 2016). The main caveats include 
public policy coordination problems, potential for moral hazard when the national level is seen 
as an insurance of last resort (Letelier 2011), scant professional expertise among subnational 
public personnel, and a higher likelihood of elite capture and corruption (Prud’homme 1995, 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). In light of this debate, an extensive but not fully conclusive 
empirical literature has been developed to provide evidence on the likely effects of FD on a wide 
number of areas (e.g., Ahmad and Brosio 2009, Letelier 2012). 
Our research builds upon previous empirical studies that show a systematic positive 
relationship between decentralization and life satisfaction (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002; 
Bjørnskov et al. 2008; Hessami 2010; Voigt and Blume 2012; Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose 
2012; and Sujarwoto and Tampubolon 2015). While results generally confirm the hypothesis that 
subnational autonomy improves individuals’ life satisfaction, some relevant research questions 
are still unattended. First, there is the challenge as to how we can properly measure this 




the fiscal dimension of decentralization, as it uses the share of unconditional grants on all 
municipal revenues as a proxy of FD. Despite this measurement being of particular relevance for 
the case of Chile, our findings have important policy implications on the subject matter. Second, 
the potential benefits of FD are usually assumed to be distributed homogenously across 
individuals, regardless of the access to local public services they have. Based upon a pooled 
database that combines two household surveys for 2011 and 2013 and a set of municipal-level 
indicators for 345 municipalities, we show evidence that FD only affects subjective well-being 
(SWB) positively for those who exhibit a high degree of SWB. The opposite occurs with low-
SWB individuals. This suggests that the benefits from municipal governments having more 
budget control only become apparent when some minimally accepted local public goods 
provision is reached. Before that occurs, having a larger share of revenues in the form of 
unconditional grants does not lead to lower life satisfaction, as it probably brings the community 
closer to that minimum. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. A review of the literature in presented in the 
next section. Then, stylized facts on the case of Chile are presented. The following section 
summarizes the existing empirical evidence, followed by the empirical analysis. The final section 
concludes. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Existing empirical literature has shown evidence of the influence of an ample array of 
individual-level factors on SWB (more on this below). Nonetheless, both social and 
environmental conditions play a role too. This may be expressed in the access to basic services, 
the quality of community life and the perception that local representatives are aligned with their 




demands is likely a critical factor. It has been argued that said community orientation in local 
governance can be strengthened by giving more power to subnational governments to decide, 
which entails more political, administrative and fiscal decentralization.  
As far as FD is concerned, this has been broadly defined as the empowerment of people 
by the empowerment of their local governments (Bahl 2008). The specific fiscal component of 
said definition entails the passing of budgetary power to elected authorities, either in the form of 
more power to tax or to spend. Defenders of FD can be classified into two broad groups: those 
who advocate its potential economic efficiency benefits, and those who highlight the 
enhancement of governments’ accountability and better preference matching between local 
residents and their representatives (Lockhood 2006). While the so-called “first generation” of 
theoretical models was more inspired in the first approach (Oates 1972), the second generation is 
clearly focused on the second one (Oates 2008). Whatever the argument, a more efficient 
delivery of public services leads to better quality of local community services and/or more 
control by the public on those who spend the budget. Nonetheless, some caveats to 
decentralization are in order (Treisman 2007, Letelier and Saez 2013). Important ones are the 
likelihood of elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006), poorly trained subnational 
governments’ personnel (Prud'homme 1995) and wasted economies of scale (Oates 1985), 
among other arguments. 
However sound, the aforementioned hypotheses assume that FD affects people’s SWB 
similarly, regardless of the original life satisfaction level of the individual in question. 
Nonetheless, there is the chance that low-SWB individuals might be primarily concerned with 
their access to some minimally accepted standard of local public services. Under a very unequal 




chances of collecting taxes of their own are more likely to host a larger share of individuals who 
assign more value to the level of municipal provision than to the quality of service delivery. The 
lack of basic community services like garbage collection, primary health centers, access to parks, 
and street maintenance and the like may induce citizens to prioritize a basic delivery level 
regardless of its quality.  
If we assume that FD may be captured by the share of all revenues over which local 
authorities have some (or full) control, we may hypothesis that this share becomes a relevant 
issue when full revenues exceed some threshold. Expectedly, individuals who reside in 
jurisdictions with a poor provision of basic community services will value FD less than those 
who live in zones where this provision is well attended. If this were the case, FD is likely to have 
different effects on SWB for different SWB groups of individuals. 
Fiscal Decentralization in Chile 
Chile has a rather simple and quite centralized public finance administration model. 
While an intermedium level of government does exist,1 only the municipal government is 
formally recognized as “autonomous” in the Constitution. A national law defines the range of 
administrative functions that municipal governments may exercise and the corresponding 
responsibilities they confront.2 A parallel “Organic Municipal Revenue Law” establishes the type 
of revenues that municipalities are entitled. A feature worth mentioning is that the law assigns all 
municipal governments the same set of functions and it makes no inter-municipal differences as 
far as sources of funding are concerned. At least potentially, all municipalities can perform the 
same functions and exploit their tax base under the same set of rules. 
                                                 
1 Formally, Chile is divided into sixteen “regions” (intermedium level) and 345 municipal governments (local level). 
2 This is the so-called “Organic Municipal Law,” in which the “organic” status implies that any change of the law requires a very 




Municipal revenues must be distributed among six exclusive functions and eleven 
“shared” responsibilities with the national government. Exclusive responsibilities include local 
development, urban planning, enforcement of the law on car traffic, construction and garbage 
collection. Exclusive functions can be said to define a minimum set of local services that 
municipalities are expected to provide. In contrast to this, shared responsibilities are vaguely 
defined in the law as they leave ample space for innovation in key areas of local development. 
Functions of this type include education, health, promotion of culture, tourism, public 
transportation, urbanization and social development, among others. Because shared functions are 
mostly exercised on a voluntary basis, we should expect this to occur as long as the set of 
exclusive responsibilities are reasonably fulfilled. This is for example the case of school-level 
education and primary health care in Chile, in which approximately 10 to 15 percent of the 
funding is provided by the municipal level, albeit only more fiscally autonomous municipalities 
contribute (e.g., Letelier and Ormeño 2018). 
As for municipal revenues, the so-called “Own Permanent Revenues” (IPP) stand for all 
taxes or charges levied on residents and local economic activities. This includes licenses on 
businesses, casinos, water rights, cars, mining activities,3 and fines on road traffic rules 
violations. The most important single source is the property tax, which stands for 26 percent of 
all revenues. Complementary to the IPP, municipal governments receive a compensation 
unconditional grant called the Common Municipal Fund (FCM). This originates in a fund made 
of contributions from all municipalities, which is then returned to them based on a formula that 
gives a higher share to those with a lower tax base and/or poor socioeconomic indicators.4 On 
                                                 
3 Casino and water licenses are shared with the regional governments (Letelier 2019). 
4 The FCM is based on a constitutional mandate. A formula determines the way the fund is made up and the corresponding inter-




average, the FCM stood for 55.2 percent of all municipal revenues in 2013. Since tax bases and 
local living conditions exhibit a very unequal distribution across the country, the distribution of 
the FCM itself is very uneven. At one end, 15 percent of the poorest municipalities get more than 
80 percent of their whole revenues from the FCM. At the other end, the richest 15 percent get 28 
percent or less from this same fund.5 Despite this redistribution fund making a significant 
contribution to inter-municipal equity, it is far from achieving full equalization. While the inter-
municipal GINI lowers from 0.50 to 0.45 (Ahmad et al. 2015), huge differences remain in the 
quality of local public goods. In this respect, the case of education has been widely reported, as 
numerous studies have been made to identify main sources of inter-municipal variation in school 
quality.  
The Existing Evidence 
Non-Institutional Factors 
A myriad of specific factors have been found to be responsible for SWB. A review by 
Dolan et al. (2009) suggests that a comprehensive list should at least include income, age, 
gender, ethnicity, education, heath, labor status, marital status, religion and the number of sons, 
among others. A global study by Diego-Rosell et al. (2016) shows evidence that the most 
important factor is material well-being, which stands for 16.6 percent of the variance of life 
satisfaction. Interestingly, the community context appears to be the second most important one 
(5.5 percent of the variance). As far as specific variables are concerned, absolute personal 
income appears to have a positive—albeit decreasing—effect (Stevenson and Wolfers 2013). 
Nonetheless, the influence of local culture and other idiosyncratic features may have a significant 
                                                 
5 Reported data correspond to the revenues net of FCM contribution. If gross revenues (before FCM contribution) were used, the 




role to play, as the effect of income and other variables is likely to be stronger in more 
competitive societies (e.g., Tsurumi, Imauji and Managi 2019). Regarding the Latin American 
case, this appears to be relatively happier with respect to the world (World Happiness Report 
2019). A collection of studies highlight specific drivers of SWB on the region (Rojas 2016). 
Important ones are family ties, gratifying human relations, social network and other non-income 
related factors. The so-called social capital, defined as the access to social networks, has been 
also found to affect SWB (e.g., Han 2013). We should expect that said networks would deepen 
people’s trust in each other, facilitate the enforcement of informal agreements and bring well-
being to the community as a whole. 
As far as the Chilean case is concerned, a number of studies intend to explore main 
determinants of like satisfaction on specific groups, as is the case of workers, elderly people and 
students. A study by Loewe et al. (2014) use a sample of 530 workers to explain seven life 
domains built upon 21 individual indicators usually considered relevant. This study provides 
evidence showing that the financial situation is a predominant factor for workers, which is in line 
with the case of emerging economies in general. Interestingly, they also find that workers’ 
satisfaction with family is highly correlated with global SWB. As for the specific case of “job 
satisfaction,” some evidence suggests that other workers’ income may reduce own income 
satisfaction (Montero and Rau 2016), which reinforces the view that regardless of the analytical 
context, individual income should be measured relative to a group. Under the assumption that 
Chile has a “collectivistic” orientation, these authors interpret said result in support of the 
hypothesis that local culture matters. Further confirmation that job satisfaction partially depends 
on where people resides is provided by Ferrada (2017), who finds that, after controlling for a 




group being analyzed is university students in Chile. Berta et al. (2015) find that family support 
significantly affects interviewees’ SWB. As expected, some local evidence confirms that age 
segments are sensitive to specific types of variables. A study based on a sample of elderly people 
in Chile by Herrera et al. (2011) shows that this group’s SWB is particularly responsive to self-
efficacy, good quality of social relations and a number of daily routines. As opposed to the group 
specific focus of previous studies, Hojman and Miranda (2018) explore the effect of individual 
“agency” as defined by Sen (e.g., Sen 1999), and human dignity (“shame”) on SWB. They base 
their analysis on a special survey on “Other Dimensions of Household Quality of Life” for Chile. 
Their results show that both agency and shame are significant. In particular, “freedom to 
decide”—in the spirit of Sen´s hypothesis—appears to be as powerful to predict SWB as income 
itself. 
One aspect of subjective well-being that deserves attention is the access to basic services 
such as schools, hospitals, recreational facilities and the like. This is closely related to the 
capacity of local authorities to provide some of these services itself and/or facilitate local 
conditions for other tiers of government—or even private agents to assume responsibility for the 
matter. An extensive literature exists about the factors that affect satisfaction in urban areas (e.g., 
Ibem 2013). Nonetheless, the role of basic service delivery has to be reconsidered when it comes 
to a countrywide analysis. Deep gaps are expected in the type of services demanded in rural 
versus urban areas. Needless to say, the type of geographical conditions of the commune in 
question may to play a major role. In this regard, the access to hospitals is expected to be a 




Institutional Factors and Decentralization 
The role of institutional factors in a government’s performance has been the subject of 
numerous theoretical and empirical contributions (e.g., Persson and Tebellini 2003). One 
particular dimension of a country’s institutional structure is the extent to which the political, 
administrative and fiscal powers are distributed across tiers of government. Since the early 
1990s, an extensive list of studies have intended to answer the question of whether 
decentralization is conducive to improvements in a government’s performance. The basic 
hypothesis is that empowering subnational governments should make local authorities more 
accountable to people (Seabright 1996), enhance public policy innovation (Rose-Ackerman 
1980), avoid excessive taxation (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) and improve preference matching 
between governments and citizens (Oates 1972), among other potential benefits. While most of 
the available evidence hinges on the use of objective measurements of quality in public service 
delivery (Letelier 2012), a more recent wave of empirical studies is focused on measurements of 
SWB as an endogenous variable, this being the approach of this paper.  
While the analysis of the effect of institutions on SWB is still new, even newer is the 
concern about the effect of decentralization on said variable. Evidence can be divided between 
cross-country studies and country-level ones. Among the first type, a pioneering research is 
carried out by Frey and Stutzer (2000), in which the effect of decentralization and other related 
institutional factors are examined for the case of Swiss regions. They conclude that government 
initiatives, such as referenda and local autonomy, have a significant and positive effect on 
people’s life satisfaction. A follow up study by Bjørnskov et al. (2008) matches 60,000 
individual observations with 66 countries. Although revenue decentralization appears to have an 




Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) extended this analysis to a broader set of life 
satisfaction measurements, in which the effect of decentralization on life satisfaction as a general 
concept is compared to a similar exercise on satisfaction with the economic situation only. Four 
out of five proxies of fiscal decentralization as well as political decentralization appear to affect 
“general” SWB positively. Nevertheless, the effect on the remaining specific satisfaction 
variables exhibit mixed—and in some cases negative—effects. By conducting factor analysis on 
25 country variables, Voigt and Blume (2012) explore the multidimensional nature of federalism. 
They provide evidence that fiscal decentralization related factors contribute to life satisfaction. 
Along similar lines, a study by Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2019) based on 36 European 
countries finds robust evidence that the effect of “political decentralization” on personal and 
economic well-being is contingent on the quality of government, being generally positive for 
countries with a low governmental quality. 
As for the country-level evidence, Gao et. al. (2014) show that “revenue decentralization” 
in China has a strong and robust effect on SWB. While this appears not to be the case as far as 
“expenditure decentralization” is concerned, they interpret said result as an indication that 
conditional transfers given to provinces, which are a large share of provincial budgets, impede 
provinces executing a budget in line with people’s preferences. A similar study for Indonesia 
suggests that, although fiscal decentralization appears to be significant in explaining SWB, this 
does not hold in the case of political decentralization (Sujarwoto and Tampubolon 2015). Despite 
no studies of this type being reported for Chile, Letelier and Ormeño (2018) show that municipal 
fiscal decentralization on school education does improve students’ performance in standardized 




can be taken as prima facie evidence of FD having some positive effect on life quality, and 
presumably on SWB.  
Empirical Analysis 
The Empirical Model 
The core of our empirical analysis hinges upon Y*, which is a latent and continuous 
ordinal variable that represents individual life satisfaction. Since said variable is unobservable, 
we replace it by a proxy called Y. This is based on a five-option measurement of life satisfaction 
taken from the household survey (see below).6 Yijk is a realization of 𝑌𝑖 within cluster “j” 
(𝑗 = 1,2,3. . 𝐽), which is hosted in cluster “k” (𝑘 = 1,2,3. . 𝐾). The correspondence between Yijk 
and Y*ijk follows Eq. 1, in which Y
*
ijk may fall into R specific ranges bounded between 𝑘𝑟−1 and 
𝑘𝑟 , where "𝑘" represents the cut points for each range. Formally, our empirical model can be 
represented by the cumulative probability of Yijk being in a category higher than ”𝑟” (𝐸𝑞. 1).  
Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 > 𝑟|𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘,  𝑍𝑙𝑗𝑘,  𝑊𝑚𝑘,  𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑘, 𝑉0𝑘) = 𝜔000 + ∑ 𝜔ℎ0𝑘
ℎ
𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝜔0𝑙𝑞𝑍𝑙𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝜔0𝑚𝑘𝑊𝑚𝑘
𝑚
𝑙
+𝑈0𝑗𝑘 + 𝑉0𝑘 + ∑ 𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑘𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘 +
ℎ
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘   (𝐸𝑞. 1)
 
where 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑟−1  ≤ 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ < 𝑘𝑟 ; 𝑟 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑅 
 
In order to capture the structure of the data, three levels are identified. The first one is the 
“municipal” level (Wk), which stands for the set of municipal-level variables that stay the same in 
the two surveys (2011 and 2013). The second one is the “municipal-year” level (Zjk), which 
                                                 
6 The original survey questionnaire provides a 10 alternative option scale. Nonetheless, the use of so many options in a non-linear 
model (ordered multilevel logit model) becomes difficult to interpret, and it does not pass the proportional odds assumption (see 
below). In order to take advantage from a non-linear estimation, we grouped individual answers into five categories. This sort out 




controls for those municipal level variables that change between the two surveys. Finally, level 
one stands for individuals level variables represented in the surveys (Xijk). Fixed effects are 
accounted for inV0k (level 3) andU0jk (level 2). Random effects are caught in variable 𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑘𝑋ℎ𝑗𝑘. 
We use the Newton-Rapshon algorithm to maximize the likelihood function, which is done 
according to the adaptive quadrature procedure proposed by Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles 
(2005). 
Data Description 
Definition and measurement of variables are provided in the Appendix. Data description 
is reported in Table 2. As for the individual-level information, this is taken from the national 
household surveys of 2011 and 2013 respectively (CASEN7), which provide 86,854 observations 
for 2011, and 87,400 for 2013.8 These are the only versions of said survey in which an explicit 
question about life satisfaction is included. Answers to that question are given in a five-options 
scale that ranges from completely dissatisfied or little satisfied (1) to very satisfied or completely 
satisfied (5). Its coefficient of variation (CV) is 0.38 in 2011 and 0.34 in 2013.   
Among individual control variables, binary dummies were used in the cases of GENDER, 
MARIRED-COUPLE, PRIMARY EDUCATION, SECONDARY EDUCATION, HIGHER 
EDUCATION, UNEMPLOYED, RELIGION, INDIGENE and NEIGHBORHOOD-BOARD. 
This last variable is expected to capture social capital, as it indicates whether the interviewee 
belongs to an organized social group, such as a community-based organization, a political party, 
a labor union or any other similar group. Variable HEALTH is measured in a seven-option 
question. As for the dispersion of said variables, CV is equal or above 2.0 for HIGHER 
                                                 
7 The “Socio-Economic Characterization Survey” (CASEN) is made once every three years. 




EDUCATION, UNEMPLOYED, RELIGION, INDIGENE, NEIGBORHOOD BOARD and 
PERCENTILES OF INCOME. This same coefficient ranges between 1.0 and 2.0 for GENDER, 
PRIMARY EDUCATION and HIGHER EDUCATION. Remaining individual variables have a 
CV lower than 1.0. Our three municipal variables (FCM, FCM_INST and HOSPITAL ACSSES) 
exhibit a relatively low variation with a CV below 0.5. 
As far as our proxy of FD is concerned, this is expected to capture the extent to which 
municipalities have some leeway to decide on the revenues they need to accomplish the mandate 
defined by law. In the Chilean case, municipalities are very limited in their capacity to mobilize 
resources of their own. Two main revenue sources can be distinguished: one is the IPP (see the 
third section above), which correspond to 40 percent of all revenues. However small, 
municipalities do have some room to decide on various determinants of that revenue, including 
the case of business licenses and some other minor charges. They can also cooperate with the 
National Tax Authority (Servicio de Impuesto Internos) in order to update the local cadaster and 
redefine the local urban plan, which may have significant long-term consequences in the 
property tax collection. On average, the remaining 60-percent share of municipal revenues is 
made of transfers from the national government, of which the most important is the Fondo 
Comun Municipal (FCM). We will use the share of the FCM on all municipal revenues,9 as an 
indicator of the degree of municipal fiscal centralization. Notably, regardless of FD, 
municipalities do have different levels of tax bases to attend local community needs. 
Nonetheless, we will assume that each municipality’s random effect will control for this. Given 
the nature of the FCM, the inclusion of a local tax-base proxy will be highly collinear with FCM. 
Additionally, the inclusion of a variable that measures the full municipal revenue level is 
                                                 




unlikely to give a good account of the local potential access to better local public services, as 
they are subject to significant economies of scale. Thus, low-populated communities may show a 
high level of full revenues per head, but also show poor levels of service provision. This is for 
example the case of education. There are 70 public schools in Chile that only have one student 
who receives all benefits (Letelier and Ormeño 2018), but nonetheless, the educational output is 
still low. 
In order to explore the robustness of our empirical model further, an instrument will be 
used to control for possible measurement errors of FCM, as well as other potential endogeneity 
biases. In particular, it might be argued that individuals and families with certain happiness 
profile are more likely to reside in certain communes. In dealing with that, we follow Martinez-
Vasquez et al. (2011) and Sanogo (2019) in estimating an instrument for FCM. This consists of a 
weighted average of the FCM, in which weights equal the inverse of the distance between the 
municipality in question (“𝑖”) and all municipalities in a predetermined area (1 𝑑⁄ ), over the 
inverse of the sum of that same ratio across all municipalities but 𝑖. By construction, 
𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 should be correlated with FCM and not correlated to 𝜇𝑗 in Eq.1 above. Given the 
structure of the country’s territory, municipalities are likely to share similar characteristics across 
large geographic areas, in which the pattern of municipal tax revenues and tax bases exhibit 
similar characteristics. At one end, the northern zone is mainly dominated by the mining industry 
and it exhibits extended deserted zones. The opposite holds for the southern zone, in which water 
is abundant and the local economic activity is largely dominated by agriculture. In between, the 
central zone is where the bulk of the national economic activity is located and where most of the 
population live. In view of this, we chose a value of "𝑑" equal to 500 kms, which is expected to 
















𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑗 𝑖≠𝑗 𝐸𝑞.2 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Individual Variables: 1-level 2011 2013 2011 2013 2011 2013 20111 2013 
HAPPY_5 2.774 2.935 1.050 1.003 0 0 4 4 
GENDER 0.354 0.345 0.478 0.475 0 0 1 1 
AGE 46.799 47.759 17.805 17.712 15 15 104 108 
MARRIED-COUPLE  0.590 0.575 0.492 0.494 0 0 1 1 
PRIMARY EDUCATION 0.344 0.327 0.475 0.469 0 0 1 1 
SECONDARY EDUCATION 0.438 0.434 0.496 0.496 0 0 1 1 
HIGHER EDUCATION 0.184 0.207 0.388 0.405 0 0 1 1 
UNEMPLOYED 0.040 0.037 0.195 0.190 0 0 1 1 
HEALTH 2.663 4.442 1.213 1.312 0 0 6 6 
RELIGION 0.096 0.093 0.295 0.290 0 0 1 1 
INDIGENE 0.117 0.118 0.321 0.322 0 0 1 1 
NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD 0.114 0.105 0.318 0.307 0 0 1 1 
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 3.578 3.442 1.719 1.673 1 1 26 19 
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF INCOME 1.185 1.238 3.525 3.669 0 0 13.744 13.775 
PERCENTILE 90-99 OF INCOME 1.441 1.432 4.338 4.316 0 0 17.187 16.911 
Municipality-Time Variables: 2-
level 
        
FCM 43.459 43.041 21.538 21.663 1.29 0.890 98.490 96.940 
FCM_INST 34.904 37.138 13.733 12.826 5.737 5.662 57.154 59.268 
Municipality Variables: 3-level         
HOSPITAL ACCESS 0.870 0.882 0.184 0.181 0.011 0.011 1 1 
 
Model Estimation 
Equation 1 is estimated as a hierarchical ordinal logit model, in which the number of life 
satisfaction categories (R) equals 5.10 Non-categorical variables are measured relative to the 
municipal median (see Appendix). Model 1 is the base line model, in which no covariate is 
included. In this case, we are assuming that individual SWB is only explained by the structure of 
                                                 
10 The original CASEN questionnaire gives interviewees 10 life satisfactions options for them chose. Nonetheless, the use of this 
option in the context of an ordinal logit does not pass the proportional odds assumption and makes interpretation of results less 




the data. Individual observations (level 1) are hosted into municipal-year data (level 2) and 
municipal data (level 3). Model 2 adds individual-level covariates from the surveys being 
considered. Model 3 adds municipal-level data. This is estimated in two versions. While version 
“FCM” uses the original definition of FCM, version “FCM_inst” uses the instrument. A 
“proportional odds” test is performed over a logistic non-hierarchical random-effect version of 
model 3, which is reported as model 4. The corresponding χ2 (22.7) does not lead to reject the 
null (no proportional odds) at 10-percent significance. 
Concerning the relative quality of the statistical models, a cross-model comparison can be 
made by looking at the AIC and BIC criterion. They unambiguously show the lowest value for 
model 3 (FCM_inst), which enables us to focus on said model for further analysis. This pattern is 
consistent with the value of the log likelihood models, the corresponding LR tests and the 
variance of levels 2 and 3 random effects, as they are the lowest among models 1 to 3. As for the 
ICC, results from model 3 suggest that levels 2 and 3 contribute with 4.3 percent of all three 
levels’ variance, which confirms that level 1 variables explain most of the variation of individual 
SWB. As confirmed by the lower values of the AIC and BIC in model 3 versus model 4, the use 
of a hierarchical model results in a better fit of the data. Interestingly, the same comparison 
between model 3 (version FCM) versus model 3 (version FCM_isnt) makes this last model 
preferred. This further supports the case for using an instrumental variable of FCM.  
Regarding specific level 1 variables from model 3, our evidence shows a positive effect on SWB 
in the cases of MARRIED-COUPLE, SECONDARY and HIGHER EDUCATION, HEALTH, 
RELIGION, NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD and the PERCENTILE 90-99 OF Ln(INCOME). As 
for variables that affects SWB negatively, they are AGE, GENDER, UNEMPLOYED, 




Ln(INCOME). While these results were expected, the significant effect of NEIGHBORHOOD 
BOARD must be highlighted, as it sheds light on the relevance of community life and the 
potential role of municipalities in building social capital. Concerning municipal-time variables, 
the dummy for 2013 (DUMMY_2013) is significant and positive. This is consistent with the 
rapid changes that the country went through between 2011 and 2013. Based on data from regular 
household surveys, the country moved from US$13.144 to US$14.755 per head (World Bank pp 
data), and the poverty rate declined from 22.2 to 14.4 percent on said span. Variable HOSPITAL 
ACCESS (level 3) is only significant at 7.4 percent in model 3 and at 5 percent in model 4, 
which suggests that the distance to basic services matters.  
Table 2: Hierarchical Ordinal Logit Model for SWB in Chile.  
 Model 1(1) Model 2(2) Model 3(3) Model 4(4) 
   FCM FCM_INST FCM_INST 
A. Fixed Part      
A.1. Individual Variable (5)      
GENDER  -0.008 -0.023* -0.023* -0.017 
  (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0162) 
AGE  -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
AGE2  0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
  (1.78e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.95e-05) 
MARRIED-COUPLE   0.343*** 0.337*** 0.337*** 0.334*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) 
PRIMARY EDUCATION  -0.0374 -0.0451 -0.0428 -0.0470 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.108) 
SECONDARY EDUCATION  0.170*** 0.159*** 0.162*** 0.171 
  (0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.124) 
HIGHER EDUCATION  0.474*** 0.460*** 0.467*** 0.504*** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.144) 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.444*** -0.432*** -0.431*** -0.436*** 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.007) 
HEALTH  0.317*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.315*** 
  (0.00495) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.101) 
RELIGION  0.318*** 0.321*** 0.323*** 0.302*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.00628) 
INDIGENE  -0.0841*** -0.0802*** -0.0881*** -0.106*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.00865) 
NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD  0.060*** 0.052** 0.053*** 0.054*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.002) 
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS  -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.036*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003) 
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF Ln(INCOME)  -0.0295*** -0.0298*** -0.0297*** -0.0287*** 




PERCENTILE 90-99 OF Ln(INCOME)  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
  (0.0015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
A.2. Municipality-Time Variables      
DUMMY_2013   0.387*** 0.398*** 0.380*** 
   (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) 
Log(FCM)   -0.257***   
   (0.052   
Log(FCM_INST)    -0.255*** -0.201*** 
    (0.033) (0.011) 
A.3. Municipality Variables      
HOSPITAL ACCESS   0.0045 0.113 0.062* 
   (0.082) (0.074) (0.037) 
A.4. Thresholds      
𝑘1: Cut1 constant -3.602*** -3.323*** -3.517*** -3.913*** -3.723** 
 (0.020 (0.042) (0.133) (0.141) (0.090) 
𝑘2: Cut2 constant -2.300*** -2.022*** -2.219*** -2.615*** -2.4326*** 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.132) (0.140) (0.092) 
𝑘3: Cut3 constant -0.554*** -0.168*** -0.365*** -0.761*** -0.5962*** 
 (0.0155) (0.037) (0.131) (0.140) (0.0323) 
𝑘4: Cut4 constant 0.799*** 1.290*** 1.095*** 0.699*** 0.8439*** 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.132) (0.140) (0.029) 
B. Random Part: Variances and Covariances(6)     
Level 2 Variance (U0jk) 0.051 0.054 0.022 0.020  
 (50.984) (28.940) (0.888) (6.493)  
Level 2 Variance (NEIGHBORHOOD 
BOARD ) 
 0.008 0.008 0.010  
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
Level 3 Variance (V00k) 0.081 0.075 0.068 0.062  
 (50.984) (28.94) (0.888) (6.493)  
Variance (ijk)     1.49e-18 
     1.58e-10 
C. Other Statistics and Contrasts      
No. Obs. 200,690 101,555 98,485 98,485 98,485 
No. of groups (municipality-time) 648 647 633 633 2 
No. Iteration of Adaptive Quadrature 29 50 45 44 111 
No. Integration Points 8 8 8 8 8 
Wall Clock Time 00:19:32 02:57:01 02:21:45 03:35:12 00:02:24 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC): 
level 2 
0.038 0.038 0.029 0.025  
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC): 
level 3 
0.024 0.022 0.022 0.019  
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 539,959.03 260,637.19 252,652.67 252,618.66 253,516.71 








LR test vs. ordinal logit model:      
chi2(3) 4,737.39 1,511.07 1,092.51 946.05  
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Cox & Snell pseudo R-squared  6.160e-07 -7.236e-13 -3.220e-14  
Deviance: 25.012 23.555 23.493 23.493  
Prob > chi2(1) 3.704e-06 7.675e-06 7.918e-06 7.919e-06  
D. Testing Parallel Lines Assumption      
Wald test for the final model:      
chi2(7)  14.00 20.08 22.70 22.70 




(1) Model 1. Multilevel ordered logistic: random intercept 
(2) Model 2. Multilevel ordered logistic: random intercept and explanatory variable (level 1) 
(3) Model 3. Multilevel ordered logistic: random intercept and explanatory variable (level 1, 2, and 3) 
(4) Model 4. Ordered logistic: Random-effects 
(5) The individual variables AGE, HEALTH, NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD, NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, 
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF Ln(INCOME), and PERCENTILE 90-99 OF Ln(INCOME) are group mean centering: 
municipality-time. 
(6) The standard error is in brackets. 
(7)Degrees of freedom chi2: i) model 2: 9; model 3 FCM: 15; iii) model 3 Instrumental FCM: 15; and model 4: 15. 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Z value in brackets. “Not at all happy” 
is the reference category. 
 
Predicted Probablities 
On further analysis, predicted probabilities for different levels of fiscal decentralization 
are presented in Figures 1 (lowest SWB) to 5 (highest SWB) below. Separate expected values are 
recorded for each SWB bracket. Said predictions were made under the assumption that all 
covariates but “FCM inst” are measured at its average municipal level. As showed in the figures, 
FCM_isnst varies between 5.7 and 55.7. If all hypotheses that advocate fiscal decentralization on 
different grounds were valid, we should get a negative relationship in the graphs.  
Nonetheless, prima facie evidence from the figures suggests that the effect of fiscal 
decentralization depends on the level of individual SWB being considered. For individuals in the 
lower level of life satisfaction (Figure 1), our simulation shows that as FCM rises, our predicted 
probability also rises until it reaches a plateau for values of FCM_inst above 4 percent. The same 
analysis on the second level of life satisfaction (Figure 2) tells a similar story for lower levels of 
FCM_ inst. The curve only turns over for values of FCM_inst above 16 percent. A similar 
pattern is observed for the third level of SWB. Only levels 4 and 5 exhibit a behavior that is fully 
compatible with the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization improves SWB. In light of 
simulations below, a reinterpretation of the effect that FD brings about is in order. As shown 




average, FD does have a positive effect on the probability of individuals having a higher degree 
of life satisfaction (Table 3). The question then remains as to why this general conclusion does 
not necessarily holds for specific life satisfaction categories. The answer probably lies in two 
factors: one is the nature of our FD proxy being used; the other is the set of priorities of 
individuals at each SWB level.  
As for the first factor, FCM equals the share of all municipal revenues coming from an 
unconditional compensation transfer. While various factors are considered in the existing inter-
municipal distribution formula, they are all targeted to provide more resources to municipalities 
with a low tax base and poor socioeconomic indicators. Those are often the ones in which basic 
local services are precarious or even non-existent, which includes irregular or incomplete 
garbage collection, under-equipped primary health centers, low-quality local public education 
(Letelier and Ormeño 2018), badly maintained streets and deficient local infrastructure, among 
other shortages. As stated above, a higher grant-based contribution allows residents to access 
basic services that would not be available otherwise. At the other end, for individuals who rank 
high in the SWB scale, access to basic services is likely to be resolved. This may occur either 
because they reside in relatively wealthy municipalities where these needs are well attended or 
because they can afford privately funded community services not directly provided by the 
municipality they live in. One example is the case of high-standard gated communities, which 
very often have security of their own and maintain important privately funded commons. To this 
must be added the access to private health care services and private education. Public provision 
of these services is regularly administered by the municipal level in Chile. 
Thus, we should expect that most benefits from fiscal decentralization become apparent 




local authorities are more likely to be in a position to innovate, devote a more need-oriented 
provision of services, take proper advantage of the local tax base and be accountable for their 
skills to make a good match between local resources and the quality of local public goods being 
provided. In the case of Chile, it can be assumed that as long as municipalities are unable to 
secure a minimally accepted standard in the six exclusive competencies established by law, they 
will not make a significant effort to provide—let alone improve—high-quality local services that 
fall into the set of shared responsibilities referred to above. 
Based on the above arguments, we may hypothesize that individuals in the lower brackets 
of SWB are more likely to live in high-FCM municipalities in which low-quality local public 
goods dominate. The opposite occurs to high-SWB individuals (Figure 5), who mostly reside in 
high-quality local public goods communities. Under the assumption that most high-level SWB 
individuals enjoy reasonably good community services, we may expect this group to be 
positively affected by FD. As far as municipal funding is concerned, individuals who face 
important shortages in their life conditions and a poor community environment will see the level 
of funding as a main source of concern, regardless of the source of these revenues. Benefits from 
FD will only become apparent once a minimally acceptable local service provision is secured 
and the local mayor and his/her team are able to extend their action over the ample range of 
complementary functions defined by law.  
Since our FD proxy measures the share of unconditional grants over the whole of 
municipal revenues, a pending question is whether the above interpretation of results still holds 
for any type of grants. Two reflections are in order. First, under a full revenue equalization 
scenario, the revenue “level” effect referred to above is irrelevant, so that FD is expected to have 




achieving such full inter-municipal equalization (Ahmad et al. 2015), the effect of FD is different 
for different individuals. Second, this is not expected to be the case for conditional grants, which 
in the Chilean case, are not officially part of the municipal budget.11 
 
                                                 
11 Municipalities in Chile have to apply to capital grants intended to improve local infrastructure. Nonetheless, they only count on 















This research provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that FD raises individual 
SWB. Our results suggest that local own revenues, as opposed to transfers, are more likely to 
make local authorities more accountable to residents as well as make residents themselves more 
aware of the fiscal effort made by representatives. While this should not be interpreted as 
evidence against the use of equalizing grants, it calls our attention about the potential negative 
effects of imposing restrictions on the local leeway to charge taxes of their own or decide on 
their tax rate, tax bases and potential tax rebates. The remaining covariates used in our empirical 
analysis exhibit effects in line with theoretical predictions, most of which have been taken to test 
in previous empirical research.  
However clear on average, the benefits from FD appear to differ across specific SWB 
levels. Expectedly, individuals in the lower levels of SWB are more likely to reside in 
municipalities with lower levels of public services, in which access to basic services is limited 
and of a lower quality. In such a case, the level of funding is at least as—or even more—
important than the composition of revenues. Despite that more funding through unconditional 
grants leads to increasing degrees of fiscal “centralization,” it allows individuals to gain 
enjoyment from a minimally accepted provision of basic community services. Benefits of FD are 
likely to show up once a local funding threshold is exceeded, after which local authorities get 
wider power to innovate and control their own revenues. Reported simulations based on our 
empirical model offer supportive evidence of this, as FD appears to have a non-ambiguous 
positive effect for the two highest brackets of SWB only. 
Some policy recommendations can be drawn from our reported results. First, the way in 




exhibit important differences in this respect, as some of them get most of their funding from the 
FCM. Since the existing law on municipal revenues gives very little if any leeway for 
municipalities to determine local taxes, it seems recommendable to strengthen local autonomy in 
this respect. This is likely to make residents feel closer to local decisions and turn majors and 
local authorities into genuine protagonists of their community development. Second, the very 
uneven inter-municipal distribution of tax bases in Chile calls for a redesign of the FCM formula. 
On the one hand, a more generous contribution from the national government to this 
redistribution fund is highly desirable so that municipal fiscal autonomy could be strengthened. 
On the other, the assignment of this fund across municipal governments must consider (among 
other factors) fiscal capacity instead of actual revenues, as it is the case now. This would 
preserve the link between municipal financial management on the one hand, and residents’ 
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Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Individual Variables (Source: CASEN 2011 and 2013) 
Variable Definition Measurement 
HAPPY_5 Life satisfaction Completely dissatisfied or little satisfied (1) to 
very satisfied or completely satisfied (5). 
GENDER Gender Men (1), and others (0) 
AGE Age Since 15 years old 
MARRIED-COUPLE 
Marital status: married or lives in 
couple 
Married or they live in couple (1), and other 
states (0) 
PRIMARY EDUCATION 
Level of studies: primary 
education 
Primary studies (1), and other levels studies (0) 
SECONDARY EDUCATION 
Level of studies: secondary 
education 
Secondary studies (1), and other levels studies 
(0) 
HIGHER EDUCATION Level of studies: higher education 
Higher education (1), and other levels studies 
(0) 
UNEMPLOYED Labor status Unemployed (1), and others (0) 
HEALTH Health level Very bad (0), and very good (6) 
RELIGION 
Participation in religious 
organizations or the church 
Participate in a religious organization or church 
(1), and other (0) 
INDIGENE 
Membership to an indigenous 
people 
Indigene (1), and other (0) 
NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD 
Participation in neighborhood 
board or another organization 
territorial 
Participate in neighborhood board (1), and 
other (0) 
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS Number of household members  
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF 
INCOME 
Percentile 1-10 of income Percentile 1-10 of neperian logarithm income 
PERCENTILE 90-99 OF 
INCOME 
Percentile 90-99 income Percentile 90-99 of neperian logarithm income 
Municipal-level Variables (Source: SUBDERE 2011 and 2013) 
FCM* FCM dependency rate 
Percentage of all municipal revenues 
represented by the “Fondo Común Municipal” 
(FCM) 
FCM_INST* Instrumental variable for FCM 
See estimation formula in the fourth section 
above 
ACCES TO HOSPITALS** Access to Hospital SUBDERE 
*SINIM, **Estudio Caracterización de Territorios Aislados 2011 (SUBDERE) 
